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Abstract—Critical Infrastructure Protection is one of the
main challenges of last years. Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) systems are widely used for coping with
this challenge. However, they currently present several limitations
that have to be overcome. In this paper we propose an enhanced
SIEM system in which we have introduced novel components to
i) enable multiple layer data analysis; ii) resolve conflicts among
security policies, and discover unauthorized data paths in such
a way to be able to reconfigure network devices. Furthermore,
the system is enriched by a Resilient Event Storage that ensures
integrity and unforgeability of events stored.
Keywords—Security Information and Event Management, De-
cision Support System, Hydroelectric Dam.
I. INTRODUCTION
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines a Critical
Infrastructure in the following way: ”Critical infrastructure
are the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation
or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security,
national economic security, national public health or safety,
or any combination thereof” [1]. Therefore, the protection
of these infrastructures must be carefully considered to avoid
disasters. For this purpose, DHS has identified sixteen different
Critical Infrastructures that need to be monitored and protected
[2]. The study performed by ”Industrial Control Systems Cyber
Emergency Response Team” (ICS-CERT) [3] highlighted that
energy sectors - dams included - are the most attractive targets
for cyber-attacks. Recently, the U.S. intelligence agency [4]
traced back a cyber intrusion performed by China government
into a database containing sensitive information of the USA
government. Specifically, the database stored vulnerabilities
of major dams in the United States that can be exploited to
perform a future cyber attack against the US electrical power
grid.
Nowadays, as described in McAfee’s report [5], Secu-
rity Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems are
widely used to perform real-time monitoring and control of a
Critical Infrastructure. SIEM [6] solutions are a combination
of the formerly heterogeneous product categories of Security
Information Management (SIM) and Security Event Manage-
ment (SEM). In particular, SEM systems are focused on the
aggregation of data into a manageable amount of information
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with the help of which security incidents can be dealt with
immediately, while SIM primarily focuses on the analysis of
historical data in order to improve the long term effectiveness
and efficiency of information security infrastructures [7]. SIEM
technology aggregates event data produced by security devices,
network infrastructures, systems and applications. The primary
data source is log data, but SIEM technology can also process
other forms of data. Event data is combined with contextual
information about users, assets, threats and vulnerabilities. The
data is normalized, so that events and contextual information
from heterogeneous sources can be correlated and analyzed
for specific purposes, such as network security event monitor-
ing, user activity monitoring and compliance reporting. SIEM
technology provides real-time security monitoring, historical
analysis and other support for incident investigation and com-
pliance reporting.
A weakness of SIEM systems is that they lack several
features for Critical Infrastructure protection. In particular,
four limits have been identified: 1) SIEMs processing capa-
bilities include collection, aggregation and cross-correlation
of heterogeneous sources, typically characterized by different
syntax and semantics. However, they cannot process multiple
layer data and take into account business process view, service
view and physical domain view at the same time. Also, SIEM
collectors cannot process data in proximity of the monitored
domain in order to limit the amount of information disclosed
out of the collection boundaries, i.e., typically the part under
legislative control of a company. 2) Gartner report [8] high-
lighted as the SIEM lacks context policies that are needed to
identify exceptions. Critical Infrastructure monitoring requires
instead that many context policies are defined in order to
avoid misbehaviour. Also the need for several policies raises
additional issues: what happens if some policies generate a
conflict? How is it possible to take a decision when two
policies are in conflict? 3) Critical Infrastructure monitoring is
performed by deploying communication networks that enable
the exchange of information between the monitored facilities
and the control systems. In order to deny specific connections
from external networks towards the internal ones, security
policies pose strong limitations to data flows. For instance, an
operation of sensor firmware re-writing can only be done from
specific hosts in a permitted LAN, where privileged accounts
exist and limited access to domain expert profiles is allowed.
SIEM systems lack a methodology to identify and control all
possible data paths existing in the monitored infrastructures.
4) SIEMs generate alarms when attack signatures are detected.
Alarms are stored along with related events in storage media,
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e.g., databases. Information contained in the alarms can be
used for forensic purposes in order to discover the attacker’s
identity and get details on the attack execution. Thus, alarms’
integrity and unforgeability are two requirements that must be
ensured to consider them as valid evidence. Today, only few
commercial SIEMs ensure these requirements through modules
that sign the alarms with classic cryptography algorithms, such
as RSA or DES. This approach is not resilient to attacks against
the module that generates signed records.
In this paper we proposed an enhanced SIEM system
that overcomes the limits described above. In particular, the
proposed SIEM is designed by integrating: an advanced se-
curity information and event collector enabling multiple layer
data analysis, namely the Generic Event Translation (GET)
framework; the Decision Support System that allows both
to resolve the conflict between security policies when it is
raised and to analyze/control IT networks. IT networks mon-
itoring and control allow to discover unauthorized data paths
and perform automatic re-configuration of network devices;
a Resilient Event Storage system that ensures integrity and
unforgeability of alarms even in the case of attacks against
its components. Finally we analyzed the Hydroelectric Dam
Critical Infrastructure. In particular we propose a misuse case
that mimics the attack that can be performed by the China
government as described above.
II. ENHANCED SIEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section we discuss the conceptual architecture of the
enhanced version of the SIEM system we propose. We present
it through the block diagram in Fig. 1 where an Hydroelectric
Dam is the Critical Infrastructure we want to protect from
cyber-attacks. These facilities host the information sources,
such as, e.g., sensors, logical and physical access events,
network system, that we monitor through the SIEM. Hence, in
Fig. 1. Enhanced SIEM Architecture
the following, we firstly describe how an Hydroelectric Dam
works and we point out possible security threats. Then we
detail the workflow of the proposed architecture.
A. An Hydroelectric Dam
The purpose of a hydroelectric dam is to feed the power
grid as any common generator. The simplified process that
allows the generation of hydropower is the following: - the
reservoir is fed by a river; - a certain amount of water contained
in the reservoir flows through more than one penstocks and
move a turbine; - the turbine is linked to an alternator that
converts the mechanical energy into electrical energy; - the
electrical energy is injected in a transmission line of the
power grid. The power generated by hydroelectric dam mainly
depends on two quantities: the water flow rate Q provided to
the turbine through the penstocks and the difference between
Fig. 2. IT infrastructure to support dam monitoring and control
water level in the reservoir and water level in the turbine ∆h.
The complete expression used to calculate the power generated
by turbine rotation is described from the expression 1
P = ρ ∗ η ∗ g ∗∆h ∗Q (1)
where: ρ is the water density (103Kgm3 ), η is the efficiency of
the turbine and g is the gravitational constant (10ms2 ). If we
suppose that ∆h is a constant in expression 1, then we obtain
that the power is only a function of the water flow rate Q. With
this assumption it is possible to increase the power generated P
by increasing Q. Hence, if the water flow rate increases without
control, a state of emergency is generated because this implies
an increase of power generated that can lead to a damage of
the turbine. Indeed, higher power implies higher number of
the turbine rotations. If the number of rotations per minute
overcome a fixed threshold, then the turbine is destroyed and/or
the electric power generated overcomes the security threshold.
In Fig. 2 we show a simplified view of IT systems that are
used to monitor and control the dam process. In particular, the
’visualization station’ shows data gathered to generate statistics
or to monitor a specific process. The ’control station’ allows
to control the process, e.g., it is possible to send commands to
sensors and actuators. Wireless or wired sensors are used to
monitor different physical dam parameters in order to assess
the safety of the global dam and foresee possible failures or
anomalies [9]. Both stations and sensors can be attacked by a
malicious user. Indeed, visualization and control stations can
be subjected to attacks. For example, due to a misconfiguration
the firewall allows an user in the ’visualization station’ to re-
write the sensor firmware; an unsatisfied employee discovers
such wrong configuration in network devices, and so he/she
exploits this vulnerability to perform a serious attack to the
hydroelectric dam. Also, wireless sensors can be attacked from
insider attackers as well as from outsider ones that try to
violate or spoof the communication among sensors in order
to obtain some key information useful to violate the dam
architecture. In all these cases, control stations and sensors
represent possible points of failure of the architecture and they
have to be monitored in order to rapidly identify and solve the
occurred security issue.
B. The proposed Architecture
As depicted in Fig. 1, the workflow is made of the
following steps:
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1. The events generated by the Hydroelectric Dam are moni-
tored by the GET module that is the security collector software.
The purpose of the GET is to generate security events by
observing multiple layer data from the sources in the monitored
infrastructure. The GET translates such events into a common
format which is suitable for both the central Correlator en-
gine (1a) and for the Decision Support System (1b). 2. The
Correlator analyzes the GET events to discover known attack
signatures, i.e., signatures encoded through schematic rules
and stored in the rule database of the SIEM (2b). If one of
the patterns of security breach is found, then the Correlator
generates an alarm and sends it to the Decision Support System
(2a) and to the Resilient Event Storage (2c). Generated alarms
contain information about the security breach, so they are
useful for forensic purposes. 3. The Decision Support System
(based on XACML engine) ensures that the security policies
established are not violated and it implements a resolution
strategy when two policies are in conflict. Also, the Decision
Support System uses a novel modelling approach based on
the matricial representation of network device configurations
(i.e., policies) which allows the computation of the reachability
analysis. The reachability analysis is an approach useful to
discover unauthorized data paths between hosts due to a
misconfiguration of network infrastructure. 4. If the Decision
Support System discovers a misconfiguration, it activates the
Reaction System that performs a control action on the scenario,
e.g., a data path discovered and unauthorized is closed by mod-
ifying firewalls rules. 5. In order to use the alarms generated
and stored by the SIEM as evidence of cyber-crime, integrity
and unforgeability must be guaranteed. The Resilient Event
Storage is an intrusion and fault tolerant facility designed to
ensure these two requirements even if some components are
compromised by an attack.
III. DESCRIPTION OF NEW SIEM COMPONENTS
In this section we provide more details about GET module,
the Decision Support Systems functionalities, and the Resilient
Event Storage system, respectively.
A. Probes and Correlation Process
The GET framework gathers data from probes deployed
within the monitored infrastructure in order to collect security
information on specific processes, and generates events when
suspicious activities are detected. The event format generated
by the probes as output of the GET is the same in order
to enable processing of the Correlator engine. In the GET
framework the process of excerpting semantically richer in-
formation from the logs is realized in a number of sub-tasks
including: gathering of raw and heterogeneous data, correlation
and abstraction of security relevant facts based on complex
analysis [10] [11]. All processes are performed at the edge
of the SIEM - i.e., in the network of field systems - and
are assigned to different modules organized as in Fig. 3. Key
components of the GET framework are the Adaptable Parsers
and the Security Probes. Adaptable Parsers (APs) are high
performance data parsers relying on grammar-based compilers.
APs are hardcoded parsers obtained by a formal description
(grammar) of the data structures and they extract tokens from
the data streams given as input to the GET framework. Security
Probes (SPs) are event pattern detectors based on complex
State Machine models. SPs exploit flexibility of statecharts
and minimize the effort of implementing all transitions to
define security event patterns. In Fig. 1, Correlator engine
Fig. 3. Generic Event Translation (GET) framework: architecture
is a software component that allows to detect specific attacks
signatures within events flow received by GET. When an attack
signature is matched, the Correlator generates an alarm. The
alarm generated contains also information about the events that
generated it. Alarm generation through Correlator is performed
in order to improve the accuracy of incident diagnosis and
allow better response procedures. The Correlator shows few,
semantically richer alarms in the face of the huge number of
events coming from single sensors. The well-known attacks
signatures are defined through the correlation rules. In par-
ticular, a correlation rule describes a relation between some
information contained in the fields of events gathered in order
to identify an attack. An example of correlation rule that can
be used, for example, to discover a brute-force attack is shown
in Fig. 4. In particular the rule establishes that a brute-force
Fig. 4. Correlation rule example to discover a brute-force attack
attack occurs when many failed logins are performed by same
source IP address to the same destination IP address. Thus, if
this signature is found within events flow analyzed an alarm
is generated and then a reaction can be activated.
B. Decision Support System
The Decision Support System exposes two main function-
alities: i) a policies conflict resolution strategy that allows
to solve conflicts occurring among different XACML-based
policies that can be applied at the same time but that allow
conflicting actions; ii) a reachability analysis that is able to
discover unauthorized network access and allows to re-define
network configurations.
1) Policies Conflict Resolution: It is based on the An-
alytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) [12], [13], a well-know
multi-criteria decision system. The AHP approach requires to
subdivide a complex problem (i.e., ranking conflicting policies)
into a set of sub-problems, equal in number to the chosen
criteria, and then computes the solution (i.e., choose the
applicable policy) by properly merging all the local solutions
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Prioritization of conflicting policies 
Alternatives
Criteria
Specificity of the
subject
Specificity of the
object
Specificity of the
environment 
Sub-Criteria
Policy 2Policy 1
Id Role Org. Id Issuer Category Status Time Location
Sub-Criteria Sub-Criteria
Fig. 5. AHP Hierarchy for Policy Conflict Resolution [14], [15].
for each sub-problem. In Fig.5 we show a possible instantiation
of the AHP hierarchy for policy conflict resolution showed
in [14], [15]. The goal (the box on top of the hierarchy in Fig.5)
is ”select the policy” to among conflicting ones, e.g., Policy
1 and Policy 2 in the boxes at the bottom of the hierarchy.
To solve conflicts we consider as criteria (second group of
boxes starting from the top of the hierarchy) the specificity
of the elements that constitute a policy: i) Specificity of the
subject, in which we evaluate the attributes exploited in the
two policies to identify the subject, to determine which of the
policies define a more specific set of subjects. ii) Specificity
of the object in which we evaluate the attributes exploited in
the two policies to identify the object. iii) Specificity of the
environment in which we evaluate the attributes to identify the
environment.
Furthermore, AHP features the capability to further refine
each criterion in sub-criteria, by considering the attributes that
identify each element, e.g., for the subject, the Identification
Number (ID, the subject Role, the organization the subject
belongs to). It is worth noticing that the set of considered
attributes depends on the chose scenario. Once the hierarchy is
built, the method performs pairwise comparison, from bottom
to top, in order to compute the relevance, hereafter called local
priority: i) of each alternative with respect to each sub-criteria,
ii) of each sub-criterion with respect to the relative criterion,
and finally, iii) of each criterion with respect to the goal. Note
that, in case of a criterion without sub-criteria, the local priority
of each alternative is computed with respect to the criterion.
Comparisons are made through a scale of numbers typical to
AHP (see Table I) that indicates how many times an alternative
is more relevant than another.
Intensity Definition Explanation
1 Equal Two elements contribute equally to the objective
3 Moderate One element is slightly more relevant than another
5 Strong One element is strongly more relevant over another
7 Very strong One element is very strongly more relevant over another
9 Extreme One element is extremely more relevant over another
TABLE I. FUNDAMENTAL SCALE FOR AHP
We define an ordering among the attributes related to the
same policy element. This ordering expresses how including in
a policy a condition on a given attribute contributes to make the
policy more specific. Roughly, attribute a1 of element e is more
specific than attribute a2 of the same element if a condition on
this attribute is likely to identify a more homogeneous and/or
a smaller set of entities within e. For example, in Fig. 5 the
subject ID is more specific than the Role.
To calculate local priorities, we perform k 2x2 pairwise com-
parison matrices, where k is the number of subcriteria (in our
case, k=9). Matrices are built according to the presence of the
attributes in the policies. Given that aij is the generic element
of one of these matrices: i) Policy1 and Policy2 contain (or
do not contain) attribute A: then a12 = a21 = 1. ii) If only
Policy1 contains A, than a12 = 9, and a21 = 19 . iii) If only
Policy2 contains A, than a12 = 19 , and a12 = 9. Once a
comparison matrix has been defined, the local priorities can
be computed as the normalized eigenvector associated with
the largest eigenvalue of such matrix [16].
Then, moving up in the hierarchy, we quantify how sub-criteria
are relevant with respect to the correspondent criterion. Hence,
we evaluate how the attributes are relevant to identify the
subject, the object and the environment: e.g., referring to the
subject, ID is more relevant than Role and Organization. Role
and Organization have the same relevance.
Finally, we quantify how the three criteria are relevant for
achieving the goal of solving conflicts. Without loss of gener-
ality, we hypothesize that all the criteria equally contribute to
meet the goal. The global priority is calculated according to
the following general formula:
P aig =
n1∑
j=1
q(w)∑
k=1
pcwg · psc
w
k
cw · paiscw
k
+
n2∑
j=1
pcjg · paicj (2)
where we have in mind a hierarchy tree where the leftmost n1
criteria have a set of sub-criteria each, while the rightmost n2
criteria have no sub-criteria below them, and n1 + n2 = n is
the number of total criteria; q(w) is the number of sub-criteria
for criterion cw, pcwg is the local priority of criterion cw with
respect to the goal g, psc
w
k
cw is the local priority of sub-criterion
k with respect to criterion cw, and paiscw
k
is the local priority of
alternative ai with respect to sub-criterion k of criterion cw.
p
scwk
cw and p
ai
scw
k
are computed by following the same procedure
of the pairwise comparisons matrices illustrated above. In this
straightforward case, the pairwise comparison matrix is a 4x4
matrix with all the elements equal to 1, and the local priorities
of the criteria with respect to the goal are simply 0.25 each.
It is worth noticing that, in our approach, we do not consider
as a decisional criterion the specificity of the action. This is
because we evaluate the action only according to its ID, always
present in a policy.
2) Reachability analysis: The objective of DSS for reach-
ability analysis (depicted in Fig. 6) is to discover unauthorized
network access. An unauthorized network access occurs when
firewall rules are modified by non authorized personnel (e.g.,
by an attacker), by authorized personnel (e.g., configuration
mistakes) or when a policy is not enforceable (e.g., no avail-
able firewall to enforce the policy). The main idea to detect
these situations is the adoption of network reachability to
identify which services are reachable from a set of hosts by
traversing devices of a network. The proposed approach adopts
the reachability analysis of the filtering rules comparing the
ones derived from policies with the firewall configurations.
However policies are defined by using an abstract language
(e.g., subject, action, object) and are topology independent
(i.e., the network topology is not considered during policy
authoring). To simplify the policy definition we introduce the
action reach that specifies which network interactions (between
subject and object) are authorized. This approach simplifies
the policy management, e.g., the undefined interactions are
prohibited as default and policy conflicts are avoided (only
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some anomalies must be addressed, e.g., equivalent rules).
On the contrary, firewall rules are represented by using a
common format (source IP address, source port, destination
IP address, destination port, protocol, action) and depend on
network topology, i.e., where the firewall is placed in the
network and which set of hosts protects. Therefore policies
must be transformed into a concrete format (this operation
must be executed for each filtering device of the network)
before performing reachability analysis. The DSS, by using
a set of rules and an inference engine, drives the process to
detect unauthorized network access. At the beginning, or when
policies are modified, DSS starts the refinement process to
generate the set of rules for filtering devices. This process is
organized by a set of Policy refinement tasks as depicted in Fig.
6. First of all, policies and system description are analysed and
a graph-based network topology representation is generated.
In particular, during the policy analysis, the anomalies (e.g.,
redundancy) are detected and addressed. System description
(represented as XML) contains hosts (and related information,
e.g., IP addresses), capabilities (e.g., filtering), services and
network topology. By using Network analysis the process
identifies the set of firewalls to enforce each policy. This task
discovers, on the graph-based representation, the network paths
(that include at least a firewall) between the subject and the
object of a policy. Since the default action of a firewall is
to deny all traffic, each firewall contained in a path must be
configured to permit the policy traffic. Hence, for each firewall
a set of filtering rules is generated to enforce the policies.
When it does not exist at least a firewall to implement the
policy, it is not enforceable. This typically occurs when subject
and object belong to the same subnet and their traffic does not
traverse any firewall. Therefore any type of traffic between
subject and object is permitted, potentially creating a security
breach. This situation is managed by the DSS, that logs the
security issue and saves it into the internal models repository.
Once the refinement process is completed, the DSS performs
the reachability analysis evaluating the filtering rules, the ones
generated by the previous process (generated rules) and the
ones deployed into firewalls (deployed rules). This activity is
organized in the following phases:
I. Expansion: For each generated and deployed rule, the
fields that contain ranges (e.g., IP addresses, ports, etc... ) are
expanded by considering network description (i.e., the hosts
and services defined into the system description) and creating
new rules. Let’s consider the rule r1 as srcIP:192.168.0.1,
srcPort:*, dstIP:192.168.10.10, dstPort:80,443, proto:TCP,
where the destination IP address refers to a host that offers
a web service on ports 80 and 443. The expansion phase
transforms r1 into rules r1, 1 and r1, 2: the former to match the
port 80 and the latter to match the port 443. The same approach
is followed for the IP addresses expressed as subnets. Before
applying expansion operation, deployed rules are analysed to
detect and address anomalies;
II. Composition: the objective of this phase is to create the
reachability matrices. Each firewall i has two rule sets, one for
generated rules (Rg,i) and another for deployed rules (Rd,i).
We introduce the equivalent rule set for the firewall i (Re,i)
that contains both generated and deployed rules, i.e., Re,i =
Rg,i∪Rd,i. Considering the Re,i we create two partitions: the
former contains source IP address and port fields (SIP,port)
and the latter the destination IP address, port and protocol
(DIP,port,proto). A two-dimensional reachability matrix for
a firewall i (Mi) has SIP,port as row and DIP,port,proto as
column. The composition phase, for each firewall i: 1. creates
two matrices: Mg,i for generated rules and Md,i for deployed
rules. Each matrix contains the SIP,port individuals as rows
and DIP,port,proto as columns; 2. computes Mg,i: for each
rule r of Re,i, i.e., r ∈ Re,i: if r is part of Rg,i rules, i.e.,
r ∈ Rg,i, sets 1 for corresponding row and column, otherwise
0; 3. computes Md,i: for each rule r of Re,i, i.e., r ∈ Re,i: if
r is part of Rd,i rules, i.e., r ∈ Rd,i, sets 1 for corresponding
row and column, otherwise 0;
III. Analysis: this phase compares reachability property of
generated with deployed rules. For each firewall i, we compute
Mρ,i = Mg,i −Md,i. If Mρ,i = 0 (when all the elements are
equal to 0) the reachability for deployed and generated rules
is the same, i.e., no security issues are identified. Otherwise
(Mρ,i 6= 0) at least an element is equal to 1 or −1. In the first
case the corresponding rule is not deployed into the firewall.
Therefore, the firewall configuration drops a packet that must
be permitted by the policy. This situation is reported as an
anomaly. Otherwise (equal to −1) the corresponding rule is
enforced by the firewall configuration but it is prohibited by the
policy. In this situation, the firewall contains a misconfiguration
and the DSS logs it as security issue. Finally, the DSS
evaluating reachability analysis reports detected issues (i.e.,
anomalies, security issues) and proposes a remediation, i.e.,
a list of suggestions on how to modify the firewall rules or
where to install a filtering device (e.g., personal firewall) to
enforce the policy.
System descriptionPolicies
Firewall configurations
Policy refinement 
tasks
Reachability analysis
DSS 
rule
engine
Filtering rules 
analysis
Events Reaction/Remediation
Internal 
models
Network analysis
DSS rules
· network, policies, 
firewall rules 
representations
· reachability 
matrices
· security issues
Fig. 6. Architecture of DSS for reachability analysis
C. Resilient Event Storage
Resilient Event Storage (RES) system is an infrastruc-
ture designed: to be tolerant to faults and intrusions; to
generate signed records containing alarms/events related to
security breaches; to ensure the integrity and unforgeability of
alarms/events stored. In particular, the RES fault and intrusion
tolerant capability makes it able to correctly create secure
signed records even when some components of the architecture
are compromised. The RES conceptual architecture is shown
in Fig. 7. The basic principle is to use more than one secret
key. Specifically, the main secret key is one but it is divided in
n parts, namely shares, and each share is stored by a different
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Fig. 7. Resilient Event Storage Architecture
node. This approach can be realized by Shoup threshold cryp-
tography algorithm [17]. The most important characteristic of
a threshold cryptography algorithm is that the attacker has zero
knowledge about the secret key, if less than (k−1) secret key
shares are compromised. Threshold cryptography algorithm is
characterized by two parameters: n i.e., the number of nodes
and k i.e., the security threshold. The output of a cryptography
algorithm and its threshold version are equivalent. In the
RES architecture, a component called Dealer is responsible
to generate n secret key shares, n verification key shares and
one verification key from a main secret key. This component is
not shown in Fig. 7 because it is used only in the initialization
phase. After Dealer generated the keys, it sends each secret key
share to each node whereas n verification key shares and the
verification key are sent to the Combiner. Each verification key
share is used to check the correctness of each signature share
generated by each node with its own secret key share. The
verification key is used to check the correctness of complete
signature generated when the Combiner puts together the
signature shares provided by nodes. Input data to the RES
architecture are provided by Correlator (Fig. 1) because the
alarms contain information about a security breach and they
need to be stored in secure way. The incoming alarm is sent
to all nodes and to the Combiner component. Then, each node
computes a hash function of the received alarm. This function
returns a digest for this alarm, represented by h in Fig. 7. The
next step is to encrypt the digest with the secret key share in
order to produce a signature share and send it to the Combiner.
When the Combiner receives from nodes at least k signature
shares for the same alarm it can assemble all partial signatures
in order to generate a complete signature. Then the Combiner
verifies the complete signature through the verification key.
If the verification process fails, the Combiner verifies the
correctness of each signature share using the corresponding
verification key share. When the node that sent the wrong
signature share is discovered it is flagged as corrupted. Next
time if new signature shares are available for the same alarm,
the Combiner uses the already validated signature shares and
the new signature shares to create a new set of k signature
shares. Then the Combiner generates a new complete signature
and repeats the verification process. If the verification process
is successful this time, then the complete signature, the original
alert and the identifiers of corrupted nodes are stored in a
storage system. Further details about RES implementation are
described in [18]. In order to improve the intrusion and fault
tolerance of RES, replication and diversity are employed in
the media storage and the Combiner component.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper we provided an enhanced SIEM architecture
able to cope with cyber security problems that may occur
in a Critical Infrastructure. Indeed, starting from a discus-
sion about the limitations of the existing SIEM systems, we
proposed a new enhanced SIEM architecture in which we
have introduced functionalities for enabling multiple layer
data analysis, resolving conflicts among security policies, and
discovering unauthorized data paths in such a way to be able
to reconfigure network devices. Also, we provided a sketch
of a possible usage of our architecture when a misuse case
affects hydroelectric dam. As described in [3], this Critical
Infrastructure is highly exposed to cyber attacks today. We
are currently working to perform an extensive experimental
campaign with the purpose of 1) setup the system we proposed
in order to integrate all the components and 2) validate the
enhanced SIEM proposed in Hydroelectric dam scenario.
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